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TORTS-APPLICATION OF STEAM SIGNAL STATUTE
TO DIESEL LOCOMOTIVE
Plaintiff's deceased, driving a truck across, the tracks of Defendant railroad, was struck and killed by a diesel-powered locomotive which had failed to give the statutory signal. There was
evidence of contributory negligence. Code of Virginia § 56-414
(1950) provided that each railroad company whose line was operated by steam should provide each locomotive with a "steam
whistle" to be sounded over 300 yards but under 600 yards from
crossings. § 56-416 provides that in case of failure to comply with
§ 56-414 contributory negligence is no longer a bar to recovery,
but considered only in mitigation of damages. Subsequent to the
accident, the Virginia Legislature passed a statute' amending
§ 56-414 to include all types of locomotive power and providing
that there be "a bell ...and whistle or horn." The title of the act
states that its purpose is to "extend the application thereof." In an
action to recover damages for the death of the deceased, Defendant
contended that the diesel locomotive was not within §56-414,
evidenced by the later amendment to cover previously omitted
cases. The jury was instructed that contributory negligence was
to be considered only in mitigation of damages. Verdict and judgment for Plaintiff, on appeal, held, affirmed. Norfolk So. Ry. Co. v.
Lassiter, 193 Va. 360, 68 S. E. 2d 641 (1952).
The court, in affirming the award for Plaintiff, said that
§56-414 should have a rational interpretation, consistent with itspurpose, not one which would defeat it. Quoting Norfolk, etc. R. Co.
v. White2 it refused to "brush aside and by our judgment render
nugatory this most salutary purpose and intent because . . .
statutes contain words... susceptible of such technical construction,
which if adopted would defeat the legislative intent." The statute
is concerned with the volume of the whistle, not what causes it to
blow. "A thing which is within the intention of the makers of the
statute, is as much within the statute, as if it were within the letter."'3 Despite the words of the title of the amending act to the effect
that application was thereby extended, the court further said that
the subsequent legislation was only affirmative and declaratory of
the scope of the sections prior to amendment.
1. Acts of Assembly, 1950, c. 476 p. 944.
2. 158 Va. 243, 163 S.E. 530 (1931).
3.

United States v. Freeman, 3 How. 556 (U. S. 1844).

Because it has to do with but one type of situation, and because
the amendment renders the precise question here decided moot as to
future cases, the old § 56-414 loses importance. Nevertheless, the
Lassiter case is significant law on statutory interpretation in Virginia. Rules of construction, simple in recital, often conflict or
overlap.
The Plain Meaning Rule is practically self-explanatory. The
interpreter asks himself, "Does this statute mean exactly what it
says or is there an unexpressed intent ?" The rule, when followed
straightdown the line, means that the statute in question is to be
carried out to the letter unless its result would be clearly and
obviously absurd or unjust. When the wording of a statute is clear
and unambiguous the court, should look no further to find 'other
meanings. 4 Here, the plain meaning would exclude other than steam
locomotives.
Legislatures often pass statutes, the real intent of which does
not appear from the words. The duty of the court includes discovering the intent of the legislature, often by looking at the history of the
particular law.' What happened in committee? On the floor? Did
the sponsor clearly indicate the intent of the then pending legislation? The history of § 56-414 reveals legislation in 1919 to keep up
with the increasing injuries and deaths at grade crossings, according
to the revisors' note, and a former coverage of "steam, electricity,
or other motive power." The intent of the legislature is assumed in
the Lassiter case to be that all locomotives should comply.
Penal statutes and statutes in derogation of the common law or
embodying any ambiguity should be interpreted in favor of the
defendant. 6 The court is under a duty to interpret them strictly; to
the letter. In Anderson v.Commonwealth7 it was said, "... Courts
are not permitted to rewrite statutes. This is a legislative function.
The manifest intention of the legislature, clearly disclosed by its
4. Chung Fook v. White, 264 U. S. 443 (1924); Caminetti v.United
States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); Lemmon Transport Co. v. Commonwealth,
192 Va. 416, 65 S.E.2d 537 (1951; Temple v. City of Petersburg, 182
Va. 418, 29 S.E.2d 357 (1944).
5. Holy Trinity Church v.United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892); Gossnell
v.Spang, 84 F.2d 889 (3rd Cir. 1936); Commonwealth v. Appalachian
Electric and Power, 193 Va. 37, 68 S.E.2d 122 (1951).
6. Waller v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 83, 63 SE.2d 713 (1951); Campbell
v.Commonwealth, 176 Va. 564, 11 S..2d.577 (1940); Commonwealth
v.Dodson, 176 Va. 281, 11 S.E.2d 120 (1940); Faulkner v.Town of
South Boston, 141 Va. 517, 127 SE. 380 (1925).
7. 182 Va. 560, 29 S.E.2d 838 (1944).

language, must be applied.... A penal statute cannot be extended
by implication ... ." If § 56-414 is not applicable, the plaintiff is

not deprived of a cause of action; he is merely left to recover under
ordinary rules for tort actions.
Conflict arises between the policy of finding legislative intent,
and the penal features of denying Defendant its defense of contributory negligence, both in interpreting the statute as it was at the
time and in the light of the amendment. It is submitted that were
it not for the strong public policy in favor of recoveries in this
class of cases, the case at hand could not be fairly said to have been
within the statute.
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